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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CA.SE 
This is an appeal fran a trial de novo hearing in Third District Court 
fran a finding of the Utah Department of Public Safety, Driver's License 
Division Hearing that the Jlppellant unreasonably refused to subnit to 
a chanical test W'lder Utah's inplied consent statute. 
DISPOSITICN IN I.CMER OJURr 
Judge Jay Banks of the Third District Court found that the 
requirerre:nts of Utah' s inplied consent law had been met, and that the 
Appellant had wrongfully refused a chsni.cal test pursuant thereto 
and revoked Applant's Driver's License for one year. 
RELEF SOUGHT CN APPEAL 
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the inplied consent 
law which purports to deny a right to COlmSel to the accused and challenges 
the factual finding of the ju:lgment in lower court and seeks the reinstatement 
of his driver's license. 
FAC'I'S 
On Q:tober 8, 1977, at approx:illlately 3:34 a.rn., a Salt lake City 
Police Officer, Henry B. Huish, stopped the Appellant in an alley outside 
of his apartment for a minor traffice violation (T-39,40,47). At trial, 
the officer (T-39) tesitified that over the next few minutes he detected 
the odor of alcolx>l (T-43); that Appellant had numbled and slurred 
5Peech (T-42,43); had hand coordination problems (T-43); and admitted 
-1-
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to having had tw::> beers earlier (T-42). After conlcirling that the 
.Appellant was under the influence of alcohol, the officer placed the 
.Appellant under arrest for exhibition driving am driving W'lder 
the influence of alcohol. He then asked the Appellant to take 
SClle field sobriety tests which were refused. (T-43,66,67,71). 
furing the period of tine after the officer pulled the Appellant 
over, am prior to arresting him, the officer made the Appellant sit 
in his car for fifteen minutes (T-47) to a half an hour (T-65). 
Such treat:nent aroused the anger of the Jl.E:pellant, and he told 
the officer that he felt he was being treated unfarily, which angererl 
the officer. (T-48,67,69,71,72,73). 
Shortly after the arrest, Officer Huish requested the Appellant to 
take a breathalyzer test (T-45). The Jl.E:pellant requested an o~unity 
to consult counsel in order to determine whether or not it was in 
his best interests to take a breath test or to refuse (T-51,T-67, T-68). 
The officer refused to let him call an attorney. Between the time of 
arrest am the tine the officer marked the Appellant as a refusal, 
about 45 to 50 minutes had elapsed (T-47). The Appellant was aware of his 
attorney IS whereabout I hiS telephone number I am could have CCJlPleterl 
a call within ten minutes. He had left his attorney's tare just prior 
to the arrest. (T-57 ,68,69). 
After the arrest, the officer read to the .Appellant the MirarXla 
rights which incltrled the right to cxmsult counsel. At the jail, the 
officer all~ the Appellant an opportunity to read a card oontaining 
the implied consent law. '!bat card did not infonn the Appellant that 
he could not consult counsel. (T-68) 
-2-
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Herschel Bullen and Sandra M:::Intosh, character witnesses, stated 
that the Appellant's reputation .in the camunity for truthfulness and 
veracity are excellent. (T-59, 61). 
I 
SKTION 41-6-44.10 (g), urAH CXlDE ANNOm'IED (1953 as anended 1977) 
DEPRIVES THE PIAINTIFF OF HIS CDNSTI1'mONALLY PIDI'ECTF.D RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF INCRIMINATION AND HIS Ric:HT 'TO CXXJNSEL UNDER 'lHE CXN>TI'IUrIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF urAH, m:x:::AUSE 41-6-44.10 (h) 
RAISES THE PRE-TRIAL CCNFKJNTATIOO 'TO A "CRITICAL STJ\GE" OF '!HE 
Pro:EEDING.S. 
§41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated, provides that it is illegal to drive 
while under the .influence of .intoxicat.ing beverages and provides certain 
presumptions which will be enterta.ined by the Court regarding blood 1 evels 
at the tirre of driv.ing. In order to facilitate those presumptions, the 
Legislature then provides for a rretlx:xi of obtaining evidence as to blood 
alcoool levels. Tl'Dse provisions are encarpassed in §41-6-44.10 which 
provides the requirement to sul:mit to chanical testing of breath, blood 
or urine to determine alcoh::>l content. A refusal to sul:mit when rightfully 
rff!Uested results in a suspension of driving privileges. SUbsection '(g) 
thereof states as follows: 
For the purpose of determining whether to sul:mit 
to a chanical test or tests, the person to be tested shall 
not have the right to consult an attorney nor shall such a 
perosn be pentlited to have an attorney, physician or other 
person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
By that section, there is an attetpt to subvert the right to counsel as 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. 
In the case Of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the 
United States Suprene Court held that the Sixth 1\merXJrrent guarantee of 
-3-
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assistance of counsel was applicable to the states via the Fourteenth 
1\meOOment to the United State Constitution. Subsequently, the 
Supraie Court has exterrled that right. In Unieed States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court held that an accused does not have to 
stan1 alone against state prosecution at any stage of criminal prosecution, 
formal or informal, in oa.irt or out of court, if the absence of counsel 
might infringe upon his right to a fair trial. The Cbnstitution of 
the State of utah, Article I, Section 12, reads as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have 
the right to appear and deferrl in person and by counsel. 
the accused shall not be canpe.lled to give evidence 
ag~inst himself; .•. 
Furthernore, in civil proceedings, the Utah State Constitution provides 
in Article I, Section. ll as follows: 
• • • No person shall be barred fran prosecuting 
or defending before any tribmal in the state, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. --
The language of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), applying 
the principles that were being developed at that time, apply equally 
to civil cases such as ours. That case exterrled the right to tlPse 
pre-trial confrontations wherein the presence of counsel, 
. . . is necessary to preserve the defeOOa.nt' s 
right neaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against 
him and to have effective assistance of counsel at 
the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether 
potential substantial prejudice to deferrlant's rights 
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability 
of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. " 388 U.S. at 277. 
In other "WOrds, the ability to have a meaningful trial, civil or 
criminal, may be circl.mtvented by pre-trial confrontation, wherein the 
accused is required to provide evidence to be used against him at 
trial. By the use of evidence that has been obtained in the absence of 
counsel, which with ccmpetent advice of counsel, 'WOUld not have been 
-4-
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obtaina:l., the police have been too often able to get convictions where 
none were deserved. In the case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1974), 
the court illustrated the difficulty with the following language: 
The rule sought by the state herein, :tvwever 
would make the trial no ITOre than an appeal fran the 
interrogations; and the right to use counsel at 
trial [would be} a very rollow thing [if] , for all 
practical purposes, the conviction is already assured 
by pre-trial examination. • • • 
The Escobedo rationale is particularly apt umer the current 
state of §41-6-44.10. Subsection (g) of that section exceeds the limits 
the:State~am Federal ConSt:i±uions permit the state to use because of 
the section that follows ~ein. §41-6-44.10 (h) reads as follows: 
If a person umer arrest refuses to subnit to a 
cha'!lical test or tests umer the provisions of the section, 
evidence of a refusal shall be admissible in any civil or 
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged 
to have been ccmnitted while the peroon was driving or 
in the actual physical control of a ITOtor vehicle while umer 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or caninbation of 
alcoool and any drug. 
As a result of subsection (h), a person charged with a cr:ine is in fact 
canpelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal proceeding 
no natter which croice he makes. The refusal h:sring then beccmas only 
a step in providin;J criminal evidence. (There is ro legal carpulsion to 
dismiss the criminal charges if the defen:iant is fo..md to not have 
refused the chanical test). 
Utah has recognized that pursuant to the section of the law at 
issue herein, an accused has a "right" to refuse the ohanical test. If 
he does, and does so unreaoonably, then he nust suffer the consequences. 
Peterson v. I:orius, 547 P. 2d 693, Hunt:er v. I:orius, 23 U. 2d 122, 458 
P. 2d 877 I !-bran v. Shaw, 580 P. 2d 241 (ut. 1978). But umer subsection 
(h) the cooice becomes rreaningless with:>ut the reasoned judgment of counsel 
to determine which alternative protects the suspect ITOst effectively. 
-5-
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In denying a right to counsel in refusal hearing circumstances, 
sare states have specifically in::licated that the result of such beari.n:js, 
expressly were not admissiable in the perrling criminal proceedings, they 
based their decisions, at least partly, on that dichotany. Deaner v. 
Carrronwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E. 2d 199 (Va., 1969), State v. Dellveneri 
128 vt. 85, 258 A. 2d 834 (Vt., 1969), Stratikos v. Oregon De~t 
of M::ltor Vehicles, 4 Ore. App. 313, 477 P. 2d 237 (Ore., 1970). 
Other courts have used the fact that their l.aws, like utah's, 
provide that said refusals are admissilile in criminal procedures. 
State v. Welch, 376 A. 2d 351 (Vt., 1977); Siegwald v. eurry, 319 N.E. 
2d 381 (Ohio, 1974) they exterrled the right to counsel in these cases. 
In Utah, prior to the 1977 amendloonts which ad:led subsections 
(g) arD. (h), the court has recognized the acceptability of access to an 
attorney in reaching the decision to sul:mit to or refuse a chemical test. 
The court has not couched discussions of access to counsel in terms 
of constitutional rights, .tut rather in tenns of reasonableness of a 
request to consult counsel. Peterson v. J:brius, supra.; Hunter v. D:>rius, 
supra.; ~ran v. Shaw, supra.. In each case cited, an opportwrity was giv5 
to the accused to call an attorney am. subsequnetly a delay resultai in 
a refusal report. The Appellant has not found a case in Utah where the 
Court discussed the right to counsel in these cirCll!llStances and un:ler the 
1977 ame00ments which added subsections (g) arD. (h) . Rather, the 
right to refuse was the basis for the privilege. 
Various courts have exterrled access to counsel to involve situatilll 
where an administrative refusal hearing was the result of the police 
activity. In Ohio, the court has said that there is a constitutional 
right to consult counsel, wt that right rray be_controlled by time 
-6-
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arrl circumstance. That is, there is a rrodified right. There, the court 
has exterrled a statute providing a right to counsel in criminal cases 
to ioclude refusal situations. Siegwald v. curry, supra.. The 
court there stated at p. 384: 
Alt.OOugh the proceerli.ngs relative to the suspension 
of driving rights, for a failure to take a chanical test, 
and a prosecution for driving while under the influence are 
separate and distinct procedings, the fonrer being civil 
and the latter criminal, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the t\\U proceedi.ngs up until there is a refusal to 
take a chanical test. 
Consequently, the court there saw fit to extend the statutory right 
to counsel to include refusal situations. ~ court expressly emphasized 
the fact that there, as in Utah, the refusal could be used to support 
a criminal conviction. Id. at p. 385. See also: Troy v. curry, 
303 N.E. 2d 925 (Ohio, 1975). 
In the case of People v. Gursey, 22 N.W. 2d 224, 29~ N.Y.S. 416, 
239 N.Y. 2d 351 (N.Y. Ct. of App., 1968), a criminal case, the court 
exten:led a rrodified right to consult counsel. There, as in our case, 
the accused knew the lawyer he wanted to call and was refused until 
after he took a chemical test. The court stated as follows: 
"By these provision, defendant had the option to 
refuse to take the drunkeness test, electing instead to 
subnit to the revocation of his license. • • • Of course, 
defendant was informed that he w:mld lose his license if 
he refused to take the police administered test.Nevertheless, 
he wished legal counseli.Ilg concerning his option and refused 
to subnit to the test until his several requests to 
telephone his lawyer were denied. Granting defendant's 
request would not have substantially interferred with the 
investigative procedure, since the telephone call ~uld have 
been concluded in a matter of minutes. At least, 
the record here does not indicate otherwise. Consequently, 
the denial of defendant's requests for an opportunity to telepmne 
his lawyer nust be deaned to have violated his privilege of 
his access to counsel. 239 N.E. 2d at p. 353. 
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The holding there was the same as that in an autarobile h:::Inicide case 
which invol ve:l an :inpliErl consent statute in the State of Verrront. 
State v. Welch, supra.. That court statErl: 
In view of the statutory provision of 23 VSA §1205 (a) 
protecting an operator's right to refuse to take any test, it 
seans clear that when a seria.is criminal case is involva:l, 
the request to sul:mit to a chanical test can rise 
to the level of a "critical stage" in the proceErlings. Tre 
choice whether to take the test will invariably affect 
the evidence that will be nade available at trial, arrl the 
presurcptions to be drawn fran that evidence. The Implied Consent 
law, therefore, by creating the statutory choice, 
has put the suspect operator in a situation where counsel 
could be of aid. It seans to us, then, that concern for the 
individual's rights requires that -we recognize a 
limitErl right to counsel so that drivers may adequately 
evaluate their decision pursuant to the InpliErl Cbnsent law. 
Id. at p. 355. 
The court made the request to take a chanical test arrl the choices 
therefran a "critical stag<:!" of the proceErlings. Thereby they bring 
it to a level requiring right to coJ.nsel. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 281, 
18 L. Fd. 2nd ll49, 875 ct. 1926 (1967). Also, because of the "right 
to refuse" the "critical stage" attaches as distinguistm from the facts 
of Schmerber v. california, 384 u.s. 757, 16 L. Fd. 2d 908, 86 s.ct. 
1826 (1966) where there was no "right to refuse" arrl no suggestion that 
a refusal would be used against the defendant. 
In each instance ci tErl in the Siegwald, Gursey and Welch cases 
they grantErl a limitErl right to consult counsel. In each instance 
they ~e sensitive to the neErls of the IDl.ice for a rapid canpletion of 
their procedures. 
In People v. Gursey, supra. at p. 352, the court stated its 
limitations: 
"The privilege of consulting with cnmsel concernin9' 
the exercise of legal rights to counsel J:xJwever, exterrl 
so far as to palpably :inpair or nulify the statutory proc~e 
requiring drivers to choose between taking the test or losl.!19 
their licenses." 
-8-
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Arrl in State v. Welch, supra. at p. 355, the court limited its ruling: 
Therefore, the Court holds that police officials 
may not, without reason, deny access between an accused 
and his lawyer, when ruch access is requested and is 
ieaaily available and will not interfere with investigation 
of the matter at hand. 
While the Welch case and the ~ case lx>th involved the 
criminal case underlying the :intJlied consent law, there is little to 
be acc:orplisherl by applying a different standard to refusal hearings 
where the results may be used in criminal prosecutions. Furtherrrore, 
in Siegwald v. CUrry, supra. , the Ohio coort expressly avoided such 
a dichotomy. Corparing the Gursey case in New Yark with a case decided 
earlier, they avoided an unnecessary conflict. 
The apparent New York result fran these cases is that 
where a person, required to sul:mit to a chanical test pursuant 
to the :intJlied consent law, refuses to do so until he telepnmes 
his attorney, such person's driving rights are revoked even 
though the right to telephone the attorney is denied by 
the police. However, if, instead of refusing to sul:mit to the 
test when denied the right to telephone his attorney, he sul:mits 
to the test, the results of the test are not admissable into 
evidence against rum. We cannot agree that such is, or should 
be the law of Ohio. such a rule \\Ould encourage persons 
arrested for driving while intoxicated to inmediately request 
the right to call an attorney, and, when denied the 
right to do so by the police, as the cases i.00.icate appears to 
be the custan, to sul::mit to the test,and have the results 
thereof suppressed upon trial, thereby substantially lessening 
the chances of conviction. 319 N.E. 2d at p. 387. 
In Utah, Article, Section 11 of The Constitution of the State of 
Utah guarantees the right to counsel in civil cases. Denying access to 
counsel under the provision of §41-6-44.10 (g) effectually bars a person 
fran effective counsel and the rationale of Kirby v. Illinois, supra., 
arrl Escobedo v. Illinois, supra., is particularly appropriate. 
It is a clear denial of an essential right, the right to counsel, 
tc require a person under the circumstances of our case, where whatever 
choice he rrakes will result in evidence in a criminal hearing, to be denied 
-9-
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at least telepronic access to a lawyer before making that cmice. lnasiui:r 
as he does in fact have a right to make such a ch:>ice, it \olOUld be a 
rrean:j;ngless right if he had no understan::'iing as to what the potential 
harm fran a particular choice 'WOUld be. For instance I if he wishe:l oot m 
provide evidence of intoxication to the court in a drunk driving cirCl.l!Mt.am 
an:i \\U\lld rather face the civil interruption of his privilege to drive 
on the highways of the State of Utah, he may mistakenly think re is keepiro 
evidence fran a criminal prosecution by refusing. When in fact, he lll:iy 
very well be giving \llOrse evidence against himself an:i causing greater 
restrictions on his potential freedan than he \olOUld if he consulterl counsel 
to determine the full ircpact of his de:::ision. Furthernore, there are few 
attorneys aware of the provisions of §41-6-44.10 U.C.A. wtx:> would recamen 
that a suspect refuse to take a chemical test unless it was distinctly 
a strategic rrove to protect the suspe:::t' s rights in a criminal proceeiings, 
or, if based upon what the suspe:::t says, there is no reason for which the 
police shoo.Id ask the suspect to take such a test in the first place. 
'lllerefore, there \<>lQ.lld be no damage done to the intent of the 
legislature nor the efficiency of the police in keeping intoxicaterl 
drivers off the streets in Utah. The right to consult counsel can 
be limited to a situation where, by allCMing a telep00ne call, no undue 
or unreasonable delay will happen. Because of the rapid dissipatior. of 
the level of alcol'x:>l in the blood, an:i the statutory one hour requirerents, 
§41-6-44. 5 u.c.A., there would seldan be time for the attorney to cane 
to the jail. Also, if the attorney cannot be reached readily by teleph:llle, 
the b.Jrden is on the accused. By such a system, the right of the accuse:l 
are prote:::ted as far as efficacy allows an:i the needs of society are not 
prejudiced. 
In our case, it is clear that the Appellant had about ten minutes 
-10-
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to call an attorney wlx:>se teleph:ine number he knew by merory an:'! that he 
kneW was h:rre. Had he so called, this case would never have gotten 
to this court and the adversary process could have taken a nonral course. 
The vitality of a person being able to defend against charges 
of driving under the influence danand that he be granted a right to telephone 
his attorney. In rrost instances, with a five minute teleprone conversation, 
the accused can determine whether his criminal risk is such that he srould 
take a chemical test, tlnls avoiding a civil determination of refusal, 
and the use of such determination against him or to provide evidence of 
a refusal to the criminal arsenal of the state. Inasmuch as there 
is no possibility of a restricted license in refusal situations, rrost 
of the tine the recamendation will be to take the test. Where there 
are circumstances in which it would be protective of the defendant to 
refuse, he sOOuld make that decision with the benefit of counsel. That 
choice can rrean the difference between jail and freedan, and should 
not be restricted beyOirl necessity. Where both choices result in criminal 
evidence, an attorney's experience an:'! judgirent are necessary to fully 
protect an accused. Anything srort of this limited right to consult 
counsel effectively denies to an accused an attorney at the rrost critical 
stage of the proceedings, U.S. v. Wade, supra .. 
II 
lliE REFUSAL MUST BE 'ONBJUIVOCAL IN ORDER TO BE REASCNABLE AND, 
UNDER THE FACI'S OF THIS CASE, 'lHE !IDJUEST TO CXNI'ACI' COUNSEL SimED 
A SINCERE DESIRE TO MEET THE TEIM:> OF THE I»l AND IDI' TO UNE()UIVOCABLY 
REFl.JSE TO SUBMIT TO A ClfilfiCAL TF.sT. 
At all times, the Appellant herein was willing to follCM the 
advice of counsel. He had been infonned of a right to oounsel under the 
Miranda warning and, as he testified, he ~not subsequently infonned 
he had no such right. He was given a card to read on the :i.nplied consent 
-11-
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statute that did not negate his right to counsel (T-68) . Urrler tlose 
circumstances he v.as enti tied to believe he had a right to counsel. 
F\lrtherrrore, he felt he had been umuly delayed in getting to the jail 
and wanted to telephone counsel that he knew was lune and wtose telepmne 
number he knew. 
'!'he entire problan involved in this case 'WOUld have been avciderl 
had the officer granted him a pmne call and limited it to three minutes 
or five minutes. The State of the accuse:i \\OUld have had the evidence 
desired and the matter "Y.Uuld have proceeded as the law is designerl to 
provide for. 
The general application of this type of law has been that the 
refusal sh:>uld be une'.Jl,livocal. Gassman v. Ik>rius, 543 P. 2d. 197 (UtahJ 1 
Hunter v. I:Orius, supra.; Peters:m2. I:Ori~, supra.; Gooch v. Spradling1 
523 s.w. 2d 861 (M:>., 1975). It is clear fran the facts of this case, thlt 
there was no unequivocal refusal. The Appellant s:inply wanted an opporturut 
to contact counsel, at which ti.m:! he 'Y.Uuld have fourrl he had no right to 
have counsel present or 'WO\lld have lost his defense that could derive frm 
a chemical test. That was a reasonable expectation. 
Furtherrrvre, sare states have found that ~re Miranda rights 
are given, the fact that there is no right to counsel umer the .implie'.l 
consent law (a state of the law Appellant does not concede), IlUlSt be 
clearly explained. Calvert v. State Department of Revenue, .r-t>tor Vehick 
Division, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo., 1974); Plumb v. Department of .r-t>tor Vehi~ 
1 Cal. App. 3rd 256, 81 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1969); State v. Severino, 537 p, 2ri 
1187 (Hawaii, 1975); swan v. Depa.rbtent of Public Safety, 311 Southern 
2d 493 (Ia. App. 1975) , State Department of Highways vs. lee, 292 Minn· 4JJ, 
194 N.W. 2d 766 (1972). 
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Since the Appellant was sincerely attarpting to fulfill a right 
he tOOu.ght he had (T-67, T-68) am was not informed that he did not, 
he was justified. in insisting in a right to consult counsel. A sinple 
telepoone call could have dispelled any wrongful inpression am irost likely 
avoided the subsequent c:arplications. 
This Court has stated that this section of the Utah Code Armotated 
:irrplicitly is "subject to a fair and sensible application urder reasonable 
corrlitions". M::)ran v. Shaw, 580 P. 2d at p. 243. The request of the 
Appellant here could have been fulfilled in full spirit of the law without 
affe:::ting the practicality of :he requested c:tanical test nor causing 
unreasonable delay. While his YJOrds in1icated a desire to have counsel 
present, a telephone call YJOuld have necessarily preceded that request. 
Had the lawyer not been contaced or, if contacted, given faulty advice, 
the Appellant YJOuld have had to live with those circumstances. :&it, 
if the attorney had been reached, in all likeli.hocxl the Appellant YJOuld have 
taken the chemical test :imned.iately. In any event, he \'IOuld have receivai 
all he could ask for an:i the State YJOuld have excluded the defense 
Appellant has been forced to use here. 
a::NCLUSION 
The provisions of §41-6-44.10 (g) Utah Code Armotated (as ~ed) 
denying a right to consult counsel in detennining whether or not to 
exercise one's right to refuse to sulJnit to a chemical test of intoxication, 
when read in the light of §41-6-44.10 (h), is uoconstitutional urder 
l:oth the Federal and State Constitutions. There is a critical decision to 
make betYieen tYJO choices, either of which will result in eviden::e for a 
cr:im:inaJ. prosecution. It is critical that an accused have at least 
telepronic access to an attorney, if such access does not unreasonably 
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interfere with the timliness of the proposed .i.mrestigation. 'lb all™ 
otherwise will destroy any cxmcept of fairness in the law and rrost 
likely will result in rrore refusals than if oounsel were consulted. 
rn the facts of this case, a fair and reasonable interpretation cal 
for the conclusion that the Appellant's request for cc:runsel was not, 
under the circumstances, unreasonable, nor did he intend to cira.nnvent 
the requinnents of the law. He s.imply sought to exercise his rights 
urr1er the Miranda ruling, of \obich h:! had been advised, to see that his 
choices "Were ex:ercised within legal ba.ux:iaries. 
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HAND DEL!VE!{Y CEXl'lFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief was ham 
deliverErl to Ibbert B. Hansen arrl Bruce Hale at the Attorney General's 
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt lake City, utah 84114, on this 
day of October, 1978. 
-----
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